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
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE AND POLICIES OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT



MILITARY ISSUES RESEARCH MEMORANDUM



**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

⑨ Military issues
research memo,

⑥ **THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE AND
POLICIES OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT.**

by

⑩ Wayne A/Selcher

⑪ 15 July 1977

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FOREWORD

This memorandum was presented at the Military Policy Symposium sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute and held at the US Army War College in early 1977. Under the general theme "Inter-American Security and the United States," a broad range of issues affecting US relations in the Latin American region were addressed. This paper considers the origins, content, diffusion and policy relevance of the national security doctrine of Brazil.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a forum for the timely dissemination of analytical papers such as those presented at the 1977 Military Policy Symposium.

This memorandum is being published as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. The data and opinions presented are those of the author and in no way imply the endorsement of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

DeWitt C. Smith, Jr.

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. WAYNE A. SELCHER is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Elizabethtown College, as well as Chairman of the Department. He earned a bachelor's degree in Spanish from Lebanon Valley College, and a master's degree in Latin American studies and doctorate in political science from the University of Florida. He is the author of *The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Policy, 1956-1972* (1974). Dr. Selcher contributed chapters to *Current Themes in African Historical Studies* (1970) and *Brazil's Future Role in International Politics* (1973), and has written articles for professional journals.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE AND POLICIES OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

American thought on inter-American security affairs often suffers incompleteness because it is based solely on the US perspective and considers Latin American views as monolithic or as a reaction (sometimes misguided or inconvenient) to American doctrine or policy. As Brazil grows into a major Latin American power with global economic interests, that ethnocentric American view becomes even more anachronistic. Brazil is large enough (33.5 percent of Latin America's population and 32.4 percent of the regional economic product in 1974) and dynamic enough that its security motivations and interpretations must be considered at the inter-American level. The Brazilian government makes its own decisions on doctrine, threats, approaches, and equipment. Growing independence and assertiveness were underlined in March, 1977, when, in response to American linkage between military aid and human rights, Brasilia cancelled a 25-year old military assistance agreement with the United States and refused further American military aid. Considering such an "audit" of their internal political affairs an affront to sovereignty, they turned to their own arms industry and West European suppliers who do not impose political conditions. Although still allied with the United States through

the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Brazil showed that it has the inclinations and capabilities to make its own security choices and priorities in its military-led model of development.

The speed of Brazil's economic progress over the last decade lends considerable credence to the confident declarations of its civilian and military leaders to realize the longstanding aspiration of *grandeza* — greatness, an outstanding position in the world. Foreign observers are beginning to take Brazil more seriously in world political and economic assessments and are speculating on the kind of foreign policy it may pursue in the future as its capabilities and interests grow.¹ In a recent attempt to quantify international "perceived power" relationships by means of quantitative and qualitative formula, Ray Cline, former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence and former Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, ranks Brazil sixth in the world in perceived power, just below France and China and above Iran, the United Kingdom, and Canada.²

Recognition of Brazil's new status by the United States came in February, 1976, in Brasília, as Secretary of State Kissinger signed a ten-point accord which in effect recognized Brazil as a major power, established mechanisms of twice-yearly consultations on global issues at the foreign minister level, and set up procedures and a binational governmental commission to advance cooperation in many areas and to prevent small frictions from developing into larger tensions. Brazil is the only Latin American country to receive such special treatment from Washington; previously it was reserved for only our major European allies, Canada, and Japan. As of this writing, however, the future closeness of the relationship has been placed in doubt by disagreements over trade, nuclear energy, and human rights policies.

The authoritarian military regime which has governed Brazil since 1964 and has accomplished this more dynamic economy, internal political stability, and consequent international presence is substantially motivated by a pervasive, guiding philosophy referred to as the "national security doctrine," which conditions the leadership's view of the world and how it defines the domestic and international interest and priorities of Brazil. Although the doctrine is not accepted by all politically-relevant groups, its application by those now holding power is so thorough that acquaintance with its origins, contents, diffusion, and impact on society is central to an understanding of civilian-military relations and the formulation of policy in Brazil today.

THE DOCTRINE—A PROGRAM FOR MAJOR POWER STATUS

Most of the national security doctrine which guides the present government is the intellectual product of the War College, or Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), of which Schneider has observed, "Rarely if ever has one educational institution. . . . had so profound an impact upon the course of a nation's development."³ The ESG was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1949 by officers of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) which fought with the Allies in Italy in World War II. The social philosophies of FEB officers were shaped and broadened by that international combat experience and visits to the United States, where they were impressed with the American level of development, technical capabilities, and style of cooperation. Advantages they saw in this model influenced the ESG founders toward strong identification with democracy, the West, and the United States, support of capitalism, preference for a moderate variety of nationalism, distrust of emotional appeals, and cooperation with the United States for Brazilian defense and development. Also significant for post-1964 Brazil, the FEB officers learned to distinguish between rhetorical "power" based on wishful ideologies and empty nationalism such as Mussolini's and real power based on technology, industrialization, and organization, and to avoid the former and foster the latter in their own prescriptions for Brazil.⁴

When Brazil created its Armed Forces General Staff in 1946 to coordinate the three services, a common command school was needed. With assistance requested from the US Army and adapting ideas from France's "Institute de Hautes Études de la Défense Nationale," the ESG was organized as Brazil's highest senior service college for all the armed forces, along the general lines of the National War College in Washington, but with greater curriculum emphasis on internal development matters than on foreign or international military affairs. Also, given its Brazilian organizers' views of the military as a source of informed nationalism and a legitimate participant in the political process, from the first years the ESG's classes included a high percentage of civilians, with the equivalent of a university diploma and chosen from government and a wide variety of professions to afford deliberate coverage for the school's teachings throughout the national leadership ranks.⁵ The US advisory mission remained until 1960, and a US military liaison officer was assigned to the ESG until 1973.

Additionally, American doctrinal influence on Brazil's military was indirectly reinforced by a large US Military Assistance Advisory Group — numbering 150 in 1966 — which facilitated middle-level cooperation and by US military assistance programs, which from fiscal 1950 to fiscal 1975 trained 8,448 Brazilians.⁶

Through analysis, organization, and planning, the ESG became Brazil's first "think tank," aimed at national elites and reinforced in its purpose by the select corps of students and professors recruited. No civilian institute or university could hope to compete with it in effectiveness. According to its directive, the goals of the ESG are as follows:

To discuss and publish objective studies on theoretical and practical aspects of national security; to study and test a methodology for formulating and developing a policy for national security, including the relevant planning techniques; and to develop the practice of cooperation between sectors, thereby fostering a high degree of understanding between the individuals concerned, and promoting effective collaboration between the various sectors responsible for national security.⁷

From the beginning, according to secret documents made public after the 1964 revolution, one of the main purposes of the ESG was to serve as a "school for statesmen," to educate national leaders, civilian and military, in technocratic management techniques and a philosophy which would bring national elite unity and rationalize the decision-making process. By planning the proper reforms, the founders believed, Brazil's promise of greatness could be achieved.⁸

Two different major programs are currently run at the ESG: the Graduate War Course (Curso Superior de Guerra) and the Armed Forces General Staff Course (for military officers only). By March 1976, the ESG had a total graduate body of 2915, 55.6 percent military and 44.4 percent civilian, which reached positions including the presidency, minister of state, National Security Secretariat, National Intelligence Service, Armed Forces General Staff, ministerial officials, and executive advisory bureaus, and scattered into a wide variety of private sector activities.⁹ President Ernesto Geisel was a member of its permanent staff. By the early 1970's nearly all active-duty generals and over half of the colonels in the army had graduated from the ESG.

The intensive Graduate War Course, actually more of a graduate level course on national security and development in the international context, is the most prestigious and has the most societal effect. It runs full time for an academic year, with major small group research policy

projects and domestic and international field trips. Speakers include top government officials, military leaders, Brazilian and foreign scholars, and foreign ambassadors. The course is divided into 9 weeks of doctrine, 25 of analysis of contemporary national problems, and 6 of policy-orientation and planning methodology.¹⁰ Although the doctrine section is orthodox in approach and is taught by the permanent staff, the remaining portions, over three-quarters of the program, present the students with a wide variety of viewpoints and opportunities to elaborate on their own views without being restricted by a school solution. The doctrinal portion is intended to provide a common system of analysis rather than a set of predetermined solutions, but it still serves to make clear what are the official interpretations of national security and the national interest. As President Geisel expressed the learning process to the 1975 ESG class,

At the beginning of the course we have a completely heterogeneous group, and in progression it reaches homogeneity by means of the common base, which is the doctrine which establishes working methods to join for national security the efforts and ideas of people from disparate sectors.¹¹

The didactical organization of the doctrine is taken from the field of political philosophy of the state, interrelating concepts such as the components of national power (political, economic, psycho-social, and military), national objectives, national development, national security, war, politics and policy, and national strategy.¹² The resultant logical system is known as the "method of national policy formulation," used to arrive at the "national strategic concept," or action plan for the most effective use of national power to attain national objectives (a plan first fully elaborated by the ESG in 1968). These principles are presented in a problem-solving, management-oriented manner relevant to the second and third parts of the course. Students learn evaluation of the political, economic, psycho-social and military aspects of a problem and the essence of the planning-programing-budgeting (PPB) system, with emphasis on practical application in their careers.

Former ESG Commander General Augusto Fragoso distinguishes two phases in the evolution of the doctrine, with the revolution of 1964 which installed the present system of government as the watershed.¹³ In the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950's, doctrinal and methodological attention was devoted largely to classic external defense, logistics, and Brazil's role in a possible World War III; the domestic side was seen in the narrow aspects of a national base for

defensive war-making power, probably against communism. During these years the school developed, as charged in its regulations, a truly national focus, a method of national interest analysis, a teamwork approach, a doctrine, and a system to publicize it, all innovations for Brazil. Its emphasis upon planning aided general acceptance of the concept by the government. Fidelity to democratic ideals was its chief political stance, to reinforce ideological identification with the "Christian West."

The strongest ESG intellectual current during the 1950's was the geopolitical thought of Golbery do Couto e Silva, then a member of the ESG staff, later the founder and first head of the National Intelligence Service, and presently, as a retired general, the minister coordinator and key advisor to the presidency of General Geisel.¹⁴ The ESG also borrowed liberally from American Cold War views and with its conservative anti-Marxism and private enterprise philosophy ran counter to statist, national developmentalist views which were increasingly articulated among liberal and socialist civilian intellectuals and populist politicians.

The study of subversion and internal revolutionary warfare was begun in 1959. Within several years, under the pressure of domestic political events and Communist tactical changes, the doctrine greatly downplayed the threat of major foreign war and sharply upgraded the salience of the threat of subversion, implying greater consideration to internal security matters and therefore to the entire domestic social system. Increased urgency was given to the military's self-image as guardian of society, leading most of the strategists to conclude that security-conscious anti-Communist surveillance, control, and direction should spread throughout democratic society to protect it from its own most destructive elements and excesses. They found civilian politicians sadly deficient in "proper understanding" of the new security problem and the vigorous measures needed to solve it. Increasing attention was paid by the War College to the "psycho-social" portion of the curriculum. In emphasizing reforms to undercut support for communism, the ESG developed the viewpoint that national development and both internal and external security are inseparable and mutually reinforcing.

The ESG group was one of the most active forces in the 1964 overthrow of the civilian government of João Goulart, who the military believed was recklessly creating, through demagoguery, inefficiency, and corruption, the conditions which encouraged subversion. ESG

antisubversion doctrine was widely accepted among the officers, and the shared perception of Goulart and his advisors as a threat to the military and national stability coalesced them into taking action against his government. The "old boy" network of ESG graduates served for the civilian-military conspiratorial group as a gauge of significant elite opinion as well as a talent pool from which to choose civilian officials with a "proper sense" of national security.¹⁵ Possession of a common doctrine for national administration and well-being led the revolution and its civilian supporters to feel competent, responsible, and legitimate in the kind of rule they planned for Brazil, which extended security concerns and military jurisdiction to widening areas of national life.¹⁶

The revolution of 1964 marked a new phase in the security doctrine and in civilian-military relations. Whereas previously the armed forces served as a "moderating power" or arbiter among civilian factions and kept interventions short by return of power to a civilian government, the four military regimes governing Brazil since 1964 have shown a willingness to accept responsibility for national security, very broadly defined, and for national development, which has come to mean unusually high rates of economic growth. The phrase "Security and Development," the modern equivalent of the national flag's motto of "Order and Progress," has become the watchword and legitimizer of military rule extending into the indefinite future.

In addressing the ESG class of 1967, President Castello Branco, former ESG deputy commandant, declared the essence of the doctrine to be that "Security and development are linked by a relationship of mutual causality."¹⁷ His government was greatly influenced both by the methodology of the doctrine, in establishing government planning in the social and economic development and the security areas, and by its substance in the tenor and goals of the numerous executive decrees, punitive actions, and the wording of security sections of the Constitution of 1967. While consolidating the policies of the revolution, Castello Branco (1964-69) attempted to ease security restrictions somewhat, but abandoned the slight liberalization with more severe repression in late 1968. Médici (1969-74) successfully took on the difficult task of maintaining internal order against urban terrorist revolutionaries and spurring Brazil to record rates of economic growth. The present Geisel government defends the normal predominance of development over security, except for short periods in time of political crisis, by striving for "maximum possible development with the minimum amount of indispensable security."

For clarity, it should be noted that the ESG differentiates between national defense, which is defined as an *act* of repulsion of foreign attack, and national security, which connotes the *condition* of preservation of national institutions and interests against all threats of any origin and hence is not merely military:

National Security is the relative degree of guarantee, by political, economic, psychological, and military actions, that the State provides at a given time to the Nation which it rules, for the realization or maintenance of National Objectives in spite of existing or potential oppositions or pressures.¹⁸

Security, then, has the function of creating a climate of tranquility and order to facilitate attainment of national interests, chief among them development. The rate and potential of economic growth, in turn, condition the level of security. To the Brazilian military the primary political characteristics of security are continuity in decision-making and general obedience to the national authorities, as a support for economic development.

Military strategists see an underdeveloped Brazil beset by unsolved crises as a most vulnerable nation, subject to general unrest and Communist subversion. The chaos of early 1964, now distant in the memories of the young adult generation, is regularly invoked as a negative example which should never be repeated. It is held that real security can be gained only by rapid industrialization and national integration under closely planned technocratic governmental guidance and strong central authority, to speed the country stably through the hazard-beset developmental process. Strict control is to be retained over the process of change in order to maximize efficiency and minimize the usual unpredictabilities of the transition. Because security is linked to development, and both of them to the regime's legitimacy, any obstacle to or disruption of development becomes a national security issue, just as disruption of national unity or public order are more obviously security issues. Implementation of present strong internal security measures and political limitations are thus explained as unpleasant requisites for continued development, which in turn will contribute to the national security through enhanced national power and greater international freedom of action.¹⁹

DIFFUSION OF THE DOCTRINE

Diffusion of the doctrine, of which just the core has been given, is

accomplished in a number of ways. An ESG graduates' association (ADESG) keeps alive contact between the College and its graduates, furthers professional bonds and *esprit de corps* among civilian and military participants, and publishes a quarterly journal, *Segurança e Desenvolvimento* - (*Security and Development*), which contains conference reports and documents from current proceedings of the ESG. For both graduates and those leaders unable to take the ESG course in Rio, short courses are offered throughout the nation. The graduates themselves, as well as the school, have published numerous works on national problems analyzed from the doctrinal standpoint. The ESG has working informal ties with civilian groups. On the military side, the doctrine became the basis of study at the Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME) as early as the late 1950's and is being employed in social science courses at the service academies.²⁰

Under the revolutionary governments, the ESG has served the functions of operating a wide-ranging graduate seminar on national problems, generating possible solutions within the general context of the doctrine, and providing a mechanism for general elite indoctrination in socio-political principles accepted by the regime. It has also been a laboratory for new security schools; and intelligence course gave rise to the National Intelligence School, and a national mobilization course to begin in 1977 will eventually become a separate entity. The ESG, however, does not make security policy nor does it have the last word on evolution of the doctrine. Its function is one of research and suggestion to the president and the highest executive agencies, including the Armed Forces General Staff, which may take its recommendations or options into account in their decisions.

The agency most responsible for making national security policy has been the National Security Council (CSN), composed of the president, vice-president, all cabinet ministers, the heads of the civil and military cabinets and of the National Intelligence Service, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, and the chiefs of staff of each of the three service branches. The head of the military cabinet serves as secretary-general to the secretariat, a study and planning group, and an intelligence planning board. The 1967 constitution provides the CSN with the highest level authority for planning, coordinating, and supervising all matters related to national security in cooperation with intelligence, mobilization, and military authorities and under the chairmanship of the president. Constitutional amendment in 1969 further attributed to it the power to "establish the permanent national objectives and the bases for national policy."

The CSN has an oversight function in areas declared "indispensable to national security," in which territories its approval is required for land sales, road openings, communications links, airport construction, and bridge and international road-building. Prior CSN approval is also needed for establishment of national security-related industries. The CSN has the powerful but little-discussed function of security oversight of the civilian and military bureaucracy. CSN representatives in the ministries prevent security leaks and monitor their agencies and employees in terms of efficiency, loyalty, proper behavior, and congruence of performance with the national plan; they are now moving away from the repressive or punitive actions which marked the institution of this system.²¹

The National Intelligence Service (SNI) is responsible for domestic and foreign intelligence and counterintelligence gathering, evaluation, and advising, but has lately been involved mainly with domestic activities. Its founder and first director was General Golbery, while its second director was General Medici, an officer unconnected with the ESG, who became president in 1969 partly because of his SNI experience.

Internal security forces include the state and federal police forces (for civilians) and counterintelligence in the three services (for the military). The most controversial is the federal Department of Political and Social Order (DOPS), sometimes accused of human rights violations in its zeal to extract information from suspected subversives.

The comprehensive, anti-Communist view of national security has been incorporated pervasively into the legal system, starting with the Constitution of 1967, which has a section on the topic. Article 86 as an innovation makes all legal persons "responsible for national security, within the limits defined by law," which is to say, within the limits of their power and possibilities for action. Other constitutional law provisions on security which have been frequently employed include:

- Executive power to designate sensitive municipalities as national security areas, with presidential selection of their prefects.
- Provision for martial law (state of siege).
- Competence of military courts to judge civilians, including state governors and their cabinet officials, accused of crimes against national security or the military.
- Competence of the president to issue immediately valid decree laws on matters of national security, subject to congressional approval within 60 days.

- Right of the federal government to intervene in the states to restore order or prevent disruption.

- Suspension by the Supreme Court of political rights of those attacking the regime or guilty of corruption.

Numerous Institutional Acts and Complementary Acts, decreed by the president in response to specific political crises, have given federal executive authorities more repressive, extraconstitutional power against those who are deemed to be threats to the national security. The sweeping Institutional Act Number 5 (1968), for example, allowed the president to close the National Congress and state and local assemblies until he should reconvene them, to decree federal intervention in the states without constitutional safeguards, to suspend the political rights of any citizen for 10 years, to cancel electoral mandates, to suspend habeas corpus in political or national security crimes, and to expand sanctions on those who had already lost their political rights. Further, all acts practiced in the enforcement of IA-5 are exempt from judicial review. Other acts have regulated elections, allowed presidential retirement of recalcitrant officers, reorganized the courts, convoked a constitutional convention, made counterrevolution a crime, and brought about many other abrupt changes. The legal basis for all these decrees and acts is said not to be constitutional, but the moral force and worthiness of the Revolution itself.

The National Security Law of 1969 shows the stamp of ESG doctrine. This wide-ranging antsubversive measure, which was to see much use and become a symbol of repression to regime opponents, stipulates that

National security encompasses, essentially, methods designed for the preservation of external and internal security, including the prevention or repression of psychological warfare and of revolutionary or subversive warfare.²²

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE: THE PERMANENT NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Politically-relevant divisions occasionally appear within the military ranks, especially during times of political crisis such as presidential succession. Those with ESG ties may tend to align against those without, hardliners against legalists, nationalists against internationalists (regarding foreign investments), or ideologues against pragmatists. Interservice rivalries may be expected to increase. In security matters,

however, the ESG strategic and methodological formulations are so widely accepted that they are the dominant vocabulary and frame of reference. The armed forces in an oversight function set the tone of and limits to debate on a security-related issue and exercise a veto over decisions which could have negative effects on security; this is usually done through a decision of the National Security Council. The army is the predominant military voice in such judgments.

Very little is made public about the operation of the National Security Council, which determines the national objectives, but an appreciation of how the national security doctrine is operationalized into policy can be gained from examination of the "permanent national objectives" of the ESG. These permanent objectives are said to be stable, long-term national goals which give specific content to the doctrine. "Current national objectives" are those which are expressed as working details of the basic ones.²³

The permanent national objectives, with the year of their adoption for ESG purposes, are as follows:

- National Integration (1953)
- Sovereignty (1953)
- Development, Progress, National Prosperity (1953)
- Democracy (1958)
- Territorial Integrity (1960)
- Social Peace (1962)²⁴

The ESG implies no rank ordering of these, claiming that they are interdependent.

Professor Amaral Gurgel, however, has provided an analysis which could allow a tentative ranking, at least at the level of rhetoric. Through a "key thoughts" form of content analysis of the speeches of President Médici from 1969-73, Gurgel discovered the following order, established in terms of percentage of presidential references:

- National Prosperity, 35 percent
- Social Peace, 25 percent
- National Integration, 18 percent
- Democracy, 8 percent
- Sovereignty, 8 percent
- International Prestige, 5 percent
- Territorial Integrity, 1 percent²⁵

Social peace ranked second because maintenance of order against terrorists was a major problem from 1969 to 1972. If such a list were made in 1977, national integration would probably lie in second place

and social peace in third. The significance given by actual policy to the six objectives of the ESG—excluding the “international prestige” item added by Gurgel—provides a delineation of how the military consensus and hence the government interprets national security.

National Prosperity. The major effort of the revolution has been economic growth to advance national well-being and strength, which is to raise living standards, lessen the potential for subversion, increase military capabilities and achieve the major power status which has been sought for generations. A principle of nationalism encouraged by the military is a vision of the future greatness of the country, practically an article of faith among the population. Although growth pretensions have been forced downwards by adverse international economics and the cost of imported petroleum, the Second National Development Plan's goals for Brazil in 1979 show the ambitions of its leaders:

- Gross domestic product of \$125 billion (eighth largest in the West); per capita income over \$1,100; 8-10 percent annual growth rate.
- Increase of jobs sufficient to reduce underemployment and raise living standards of poorer classes and regions.
- Economically active population of about 40 million; total population of 120 million.
- Substantial reduction of regional and class disparities.
- Federal budget of about \$9 billion a year.
- Foreign trade flow to exceed \$40 billion yearly.

In the Brazilian model of state-led capitalist market economy, managed by civilian technocrats, production has been heavily favored over distribution and societal structural change. It has been argued that the “pie” must grow before it can be divided, that present injustices are inevitable but temporary results of normal rapid economic growth. Official policies heavily favor business and the state corporations, but labor unions are tightly controlled by government, and the meager minimum wage increase has been kept below the rate of price rise for over a decade. Levels of welfare for the workers are rising slowly, if at all. Inequality of income distribution between social classes and regions continues to be aggravated by the ways in which rapid industrialization favors some groups and regions. Only palliative income redistribution and land reform policies have appeared. The 1970 census showed income more unevenly distributed by class than in 1960. Brazil's present income distribution can be likened to a small Sweden or Belgium inside a giant Indonesia; according to one characterization, about 5 million live at average European levels, about 15 million live at

the standard of rich underdeveloped countries, and over 80 million live at a standard of living which is among Latin America's lowest.²⁶

Although national development is the prime permanent national objective and is said to be reinforcing of security, the unbalanced development which Brazil has been pursuing and the unwillingness or inability of the government to allocate more broadly the benefits of development and to foster more general well-being are the greatest threats to stability over the long run. Even though ESG formulations and government pronouncements customarily speak of "general development" or the "general welfare of the nation," the progress of the "miracle" has until now been for a small fraction of the population at the expense of the majority. The proper balance to be struck between stimulating macro growth and encouraging more equal income distribution will continue to be a matter of controversy.

National Integration. Programs to speed both societal and spatial integration were begun in mid-1970 to forge national unity and widen the share of prosperity to weaken the regionalistic dualism of city-backlands and rich-poor which has hindered Brazil's full operation as a modern nation by restricting its progress to a few zones or classes.

The Program of Social Integration is designed to further a sense of economic participation through a profit-sharing system to provide cash for major financial needs of employees and somewhat offset the wage restraint policy. Stricter tax collection and fiscal incentives for investment in specified development projects have served mildly to redistribute investment regionally. Educational expansion is impressive at all levels, from the community-based literacy campaign (MOBRAL), to the growing number of universities, enlivened by reforms for full-time teaching, development-related coursework and community participation. Job-related educational opportunities for workers are being expanded. Increasingly popular are Operation Rondon (a VISTA-type extension of university students into the urban slums and the backlands) and Operational Mauá (an internship for young people interested in business careers), both designed to train future leaders. Significantly, the slogan of Operation Rondon is "Integrar para não entregar" ("Integrate in order not to lose sovereignty").

Government planners are seeking national unity through the creation of national consciousness within a political and economic community linked by a value consensus on the advantages of progress and modernization. Harmony between labor and management is expected to yield less class-consciousness, a more stable political system, more

rapid economic development, greater well-being for all, enhanced national security, and, consequently, commensurate international status. National power will benefit in its intangible elements: the upgrading of human resources, internal cohesion and national spirit, and the preparation of the population to handle the attitudes and technology of modernity.

Spatial integration under the Program of National Integration is engineered to minimize regional diversities, unite the disparate regions into a truly national life, and occupy the vast empty tracts to maximize discovery and accessibility of national resources. This involves transportation, communication, and settlement programs. The two regions receiving preferential treatment are the Northeast and the Amazon, with some attention given to the Center-West. Industrial development of the Northeast is to be accelerated to make the region more self-sufficient and less likely to induce migration to the Center-South. Both the interior of the Northeast and the Amazon are the objects of colonization and agricultural experiments.

The dramatization, speed, and extent of the Amazon project make it of strategic significance and prestige value. The new all-weather east-west 3,350-mile Transamazon Highway runs from extreme eastern Brazil to Peru, and the 900-mile Cuiabá-Santarem north-south line links the main trunk to the Center-West and the industrialized population centers of the South. Occupation of the adjacent forest and plains takes the initial form of agricultural colonies and small cities within the government-owned strips on either side. Brasília encourages immigrants and supplies them with training, equipment, and outside support, but no great number of colonizers has appeared.

Although private enterprise has been invited to collaborate, capital risks are so high that the government, and particularly the military, has had to do most of the work. Because of the strategic significance of the mission, the headquarters of the army's Amazon Command was moved from Belem westward to Manaus. The army takes the lead in setting up colonies, building roads, constructing bridges, installing sanitation systems, providing public health centers, establishing communications networks, clearing land for planting, teaching agricultural and building techniques, carrying out airfield construction, providing transportation, and establishing security. The navy (with a base near Belem) is involved in control of the sea and the 12,000 miles of navigable rivers, search and rescue, medical and social assistance to riverbank dwellers, maintenance of navigational devices, and riverine transportation and

support for other government and private organizations. Transportation, aerial mapping, search and rescue, and mail delivery into isolated areas are the province of the air force's C-47's, C-130's, and amphibious planes; high priority is given to developing new airfields and acquiring aircraft and flight control systems suitable to the Amazon. In conjunction with the Ministry of Communications, all three services contribute to the rapid expansion of the national telecommunications network.

Brazilian leaders argue that a military security presence must be maintained in the Amazon to guarantee effective occupation of a vast and impoverished territory with less than 5 percent of the population but with great resources at a time when world resources and land are rapidly being depleted by population and economic growth. Rumors and reports of scattered misdeeds of scheming foreigners helped convince the armed forces toward the end of the 1960's that they should move decisively in the Amazon to protect Brazilian interests. The Amazon Military Command has given priority to implantation of garrisons and colonies along the new highways, across the border from viable settlements in neighboring countries, at easy access points to the national territory, and near mineral resources or agricultural holdings (especially those worked by foreigners). The army's Jungle Warfare Training Center at Manaus has gained a reputation for mobility and effectiveness in the jungle, and a number of officers from other countries are now training there.

The strategic significance of the integration of the Amazon is great, representing occupation of the interior of South America which acted as a *de facto* empty buffer zone between coastally-oriented Brazil and five surrounding independent countries. The planned highway network will not only integrate Brazil but also link it by ground with population centers of Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, and French Guiana. The Transamazon is to tie into the Peruvian system at Pucallpa (and hence to the Pacific) and intersects the major southern tributaries at about the limit of their navigability, creating cross-continental land-water ties which will be furnished with ports and boat service. In conjunction with the Brazilian highway network this new cross-linked system provides greater troop mobility to the interior and the distant northwestern borders, which has made some of the neighboring military establishments nervous, especially that of Peru.

Even if the new highways do not raise border tensions or tempt Brazil into foreign interventions, they will serve as channels for

expansion of Brazilian goods and influence into all surrounding states, sometimes in areas remote from their population centers. Brazil could influence the course of development in the Amazonian regions of neighboring states via cross-border economic attraction. Much in the nature of this future relationship depends on the style and speed of Brazil's advance into its hinterland, as perceived by its neighbors. The integration as carried out so far has appeared an exercise in healthy, nonaggressive nationalism and a source of pride in an engineering feat of the first magnitude.

Social Peace. Because direct foreign attack is improbable, much of the mission of the armed forces concerns maintenance of the political stability and order which the National Security Council sees as necessary to economic growth. Social peace means not only the avoidance of political violence and disruption, such as in the 1967-72 fight against terrorists, but also contained social change, uninterrupted production, strong social organization and discipline with moralistic overtones, and stress on traditional values. Administration takes precedence over politics. This is all maintained via incontrovertible, supposedly apolitical motives equated with patriotism and nonsubservience to any subnational interest.

Limited participation is channeled by the state, while open opposition to the system of government itself is not tolerated. Press censorship and warnings have sporadically been used to discourage both press sensationalism and full public knowledge or debate about topics such as the 1974-76 meningitis epidemic, frequent high clerical criticisms of the government, rumored political openings, torture of political prisoners, financial scandals, expulsion of urban squatters or peasants from land, terrorist and guerrilla activity, and presidential succession, all in the name of national security. Congress and the judiciary have been cut off from effective power as unreliable. Students, intellectuals, old-line politicians, priests, union leaders, journalists, and others have been either de-politicized or co-opted, as security forces search for subversive agents secreted in the media, unions, universities, Church, and political parties.

This definition of social peace came about as a reaction to the chaos of the period immediately preceding the 1964 revolution, a time which the revolutionary leaders saw as characterized by manipulated mass participation and demands, radicalism, economic stagnation, administrative disorder, and Communist infiltration in the government. The response since 1964 has consisted of polar opposites—limited

participation and demands, conservatism, economic growth, centralized planning, and stress on moral values and the family (involving film censorship, patriotic displays, and antidrug campaigns). Military participation in civics education is organized around local patriotic meetings, pro-Christianity anti-Communist courses, indoctrination in the ideals of the 1964 revolution, and lectures on international relations and revolutionary war, all preaching to civilians and recruits the need to defend the country against Communist subversion and psychological war. Another goal is to present the military as the principal bastion against the erosion of national life by Communist propaganda.

In the interpretation of the government, the growth experienced and the wider range of options now open to the country justify the stern measures taken by the succession of revolutionary governments. The exclusiveness which the military has arrogated to itself to decide the parameters of national interest and public policy, however, does entail difficulty in differentiating between legitimate political opposition and outright subversion. Strong criticism of the revolution or its policies is taken as evidence of unpatriotic attitudes voiced by one under the influence of antinational forces. Subversion, then, receives a broad definition—sustained opposition to the government—and national security laws become the ultimate reply to those who persist in trying to participate in politics in ways other than the approved and narrowly circumscribed ones. The vigor and range of governmental security measures and accusations of torture have strained Church-state relations over the questions of human rights and social justice. In turn, hard-line supporters of the government see in the human rights and social justice issue an opposition campaign to overthrow the system, not just to reform its excesses.

Democracy. One purpose of the 1964 revolution was to sanitize the political system to remove the corruption, dissension, demagoguery, stagnation, and narrow self-interest which had immobilized the nation under the name of representative democracy. Thirteen years later, the predominant military opinion is that this restructuring is not yet complete, and that a return to full civilian leadership and public liberties must be delayed further until long-range development plans (and major power status) are assured and civilian leaders are inculcated with a "proper sense of national security." Return to democratic normality is postponed as officials speak of democracy, development and sovereignty as qualities to be sought, built, and perfected with time. International conditions and domestic population pressures give

Brazil's leaders a sense of urgency about rapid development, a conviction that the country must maximize its potential now or risk permanent second or third class status. Therefore, subnational interests and bickering will not be allowed to stand in the way of progress.

The building of democracy as the eventual political goal, nonetheless, is reiterated as a governmental concern, but a democracy capable of strong measures of self-defense against those who would destroy it. Because of its present stage of development, Brazilian society is seen as highly vulnerable to subversion, necessitating political controls now to preserve democratic options for the time when the country has the economic and social bases to exercise them fully. Such controls have included enforcement of strict party discipline, limitation of subjects the Congress may investigate, liberal use of presidential decree powers, indirect elections for some major offices, and laws to control closely the amount and type of information given by candidates during campaigns.

The government has not articulated a complete ideology of the revolution, so just what sort of democracy is being incubated is unclear. A 1971-72 attempt to institutionalize an extreme right wing political model in reaction to terrorism failed because of opposition within the military, but some of the forces behind it still remain active in opposition to the moderates who want to build democracy. American Brazilianists generally agree that the political culture of Brazil contains elements of both democracy and of authoritarian pre-1974 Portugal-style corporativism so the political direction in which this transitional period will lead the country is still uncertain.²⁷ Former Planning Minister and current Ambassador to London, Roberto Campos, while admitting some semantic contradictions, classified the present regime as liberal authoritarianism, a political innovation combining some restrictions on full democracy with an overriding dedication to building democracy as the ultimate goal.²⁸

Early in his administration, Médici stated that he intended to leave democracy "definitively installed" in Brazil but soon felt obliged to resort to a strengthening of the instruments of control. Similarly, Geisel began his administration in March, 1974, with talk of "decompression" but within a year his ideas of improving income distribution, promoting market expansion, lessening repression, and ending censorship had met with such opposition from the right wing, particularly Médici supporters, that progress in this direction has been slowed in the name of stability.

While civilian demands for a more open system have increased since the opposition MDB party's gains in the congressional elections of November, 1974 (which the rightists wanted to cancel), democracy's future in Brazil will depend most upon the dispute between military "legalists" who favor rule of law and greater civilian participation (with the military as the traditional moderator) and those "hardliners" who stress security and warn that subversion has only been temporarily contained (necessitating continued military rule). At present, the military consensus is unwilling to sacrifice the achievements of the revolution to an unpredictable civilian successor or to an official ARENA party which cannot win repeated, clear mandates at the polls. Even the ARENA victory in local elections of November, 1976, was not officially accepted as anything beyond public endorsement of the government's programs.

The MDB opposition party is kept impotent, without a hope of aspiring to governmental status, even though its popularity is apparently growing at the national level. Its precarious position was underlined in April, 1977, when President Geisel suspended Congress for an indefinite period because of MDB blockage of his judiciary reform bill. Stating his intention of decreeing into law that bill and other unspecified measures, the President referred to the opposition as a "stumbling block" to the well-being of the nation and a "dictatorship inside Congress."²⁹ As was done in 1968 when Congress was closed (for nine months), it is expected that governmental reforms will be passed to restrict opposition strength, this time to cut off its chances to do well in 1978's scheduled direct elections for state governors.

Sovereignty. To the ESG sovereignty implies the pursuit of the means of power needed to sustain an independent foreign policy motivated by a distinctly Brazilian view of world affairs. Domestically, sovereignty means tight control of resources and the developmental process under a model appropriate to national needs. Self-sufficiency must be attained wherever possible, including military power. Only in these ways, it is held, can the nation progress most rapidly toward its acknowledged potential for the benefit of its own citizens. The drive to establish Brazil as a major power is closely interrelated with the desire for effective sovereignty because its foreign policy elites believe that rationally applied national power and not the generosity of other states is the best guarantor of respect and equality of rights and opportunities.

It is this strong desire for sovereignty that leads Brazil to decry the "freezing of the structure of world power"—a perceived effort by the

great powers to combine into a closed club from which other aspiring powers would be barred. Brazil has also reacted nationalistically to foreign criticisms of its economic and political choices, including development of the Amazon, toleration of industrial pollution, resistance to birth control programs, treatment of Indians, human rights violations, the hydroelectric complex on the Paraná River, and a 1975 atomic energy agreement with West Germany. Brazil's insistence on sovereignty was behind its stiff resistance to Washington's rather mild 1977 criticism of the human rights situation there and the State Department's request for changes in or postponement of the Bonn-Brasília agreement which would give Brazil an independent nuclear fuel enrichment capability. The Carter administration wishes to discourage spread of the nuclear weapons potential inherent in plutonium extraction, but the Brazilians deny ambitions to make a weapon and justify their interest in terms of peaceful technological and fuel independence.

Territorial Integrity. Brazil's geopolitical position and successful legal resolution of border disputes with its ten neighbors have kept territorial integrity in the sense of attack from being a major concern, although the army has created border posts in sparsely populated areas, the air force carries out aerial surveillance, and the navy patrols the 200 mile wide coastal zone.

CONCLUSIONS: POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE

In contrast to the preceding civilian regimes, the military governments of Brazil since 1964 have accepted the national security doctrine as the basis of a strategy of development, prescribing strong centralized administration, rational and gradualist solutions, state-led growth with private enterprise collaboration, a technocratic managerial approach to "do away with" politics, efficiency and productivity, nationalism and great power ambitions, broad significance to national security, and the spread of military surveillance and activity in defense of what is described as a still vulnerable democratic and open society subject to Communist subversion. Military rule under the doctrine has had the modernizing effect of moralistically imposing social discipline, national consciousness, and economic responsibility on the middle class, in return for benefits of economic growth, much as the expansion of the suffrage imposed restrictions on the economic power elites during the industrialization of the United States and Europe.³⁰

In contrast to pluralistic American practice, national security doctrine in more centralized, authoritarian Brazil is not subject to public debate, and is much narrower in its restricted institutional origins and much broader in its (largely domestic) applications, influencing nearly all areas of authoritative national interest determination in the military regime. The broad definition of national security employed takes security concerns far beyond antisubversive activity and maintenance of public order to the spheres of creation and direction of national power. Brazilian security doctrine conditions intentions and urges creation of greater capabilities.

Brazilian officials have explicitly approached the following diverse issues from a national security perspective over the last several years:

- The holding of or form of elections; presidential succession.
- Discussion, lowering, and lifting of censorship for political or moral reasons.
- The existence or rate of political liberalization, and the MDB's role in the system.
- Debate on human rights—torture, habeas corpus, treatment of Indians.
- The role of the armed forces in the system; personal criticism of government officials.
- Existence or modification of the Institutional Acts and suspensions of political rights.
- Government corruption cases—prosecution, publicity.
- Risk contracts for oil exploration by foreign companies.
- 200 mile territorial waters decree.
- Occupation of the Amazon; success of the Trans-Amazon Highway.
- Concentration or redistribution of national income; level of the minimum wage.
- Role of foreign capital and foreign debt; denationalization of the economy.
- National market expansion vs. export drive as a means of industrialization.
- Population policy, family planning, migration demographics.
- Economic development and industrialization generally; the military's role in development.
- Nuclear power policy.
- Extent of landholdings of foreigners.
- Racial discrimination.

Additionally, officials have seen a number of national security threats of a more conventional nature: uncertain political situations in neighboring countries, border disputes and tensions, foreign warships along the coast, unauthorized overflights, suspected activities of foreigners in sparsely settled areas, unauthorized foreign fishing vessels, terrorism, political kidnapping, and internal subversion.

The past, present, and probable future political and policy role of the doctrine's application would include the following functions:

- Contributes heavily as a mythology or point of reference to boost military unity and confidence, although its most judicious application is becoming a point of tension within the military and between the military and citizens favoring liberalization.

- Gathers support from anti-Communist elements of society.

- Lends an authoritarian, conservative, technocratic style to the regime, giving the military a sense of urgency about development, reserving areas of responsibility for the executive, and emphasizing ends over means.

- Fosters a cooperative style of nationalism, with (presently) latent harder-line elements, and great power ambitions.

- Facilitates governmental coordination and planning, philosophically and systematically, through the "national strategic concept."

- Spreads military involvement in management and planning by virtue of the broad definition of national security and respect for the concept.

- Is the source of the mission of the armed forces and the rationale for their modernization.

- Provides the dominant vocabulary and frame of reference for the regime, extending deeply into the legal system.

- Charges the military with a major responsibility for the national destiny, making it more difficult for them to leave power.

- In conjunction with development, is the legitimizer of the regime.

- Impresses military points of view on significant civilian leadership sectors.

- Imposes social discipline, national consciousness, and economic responsibility on the middle class.

The doctrine, however, is not so elaborate, detailed, or operational as to provide specific answers to policy problems. It is rather a diffuse perceptual or conditioning belief system which legitimizes certain goals and procedures and forbids others. It is sometimes used as an *ex post*

facto rationalization for policy changes. Major policy changes have also been explained beforehand to higher officers on doctrinal grounds to obtain the necessary general military support before the change in course was publicly announced. The doctrine is significant in both its proscriptive and prescriptive aspects, but the former appear to be more prominent. Split-away arguments over the doctrine among higher level officers, then, could be seen as foreshadowing or indicating major policy differences.

Brazilian columnist Carlos Castello Branco referred to the government as a two-dimensional power system, a "governo com estrutura dupla," in which the hidden security apparatus forms the real government making the basic decisions, while the president serves as a link between this background structure and the ostensible public figures making up the visible administrative face of the system. In its relations with society, the administration has relative autonomy, but always subject, as is the president, to the "hidden supervision" (*fiscalização oculta*) of the security bureaucracy which maintains a veto over independent political initiatives of which it disapproves.³¹ Significantly, one of the first obstacles to political decompression for the security bureaucracy was the opposition's desire to reveal and investigate excesses of the security forces. Imperatives of national security have been the rationale for most of the governmental decisions slowing or stopping liberalization of the regime.

The doctrine provides the regime with sufficient unity and confidence to persist, the only military rule in a major South American nation to have passed the decade mark in this century.³² The "Security and Development" motto is the government's chief legitimizer and gives the military such a stake in the success and continuation of present official policy that retreat to the traditional arbiter role may be difficult. The military sees itself charged with the national destiny and the drive to major power status within a single generation, requiring extended authoritarian rule to guarantee continuity, in what Alfred Stepan has termed the "new professionalism."³³ Military, not civilian, groups are the president's principal constituency and have exercised considerable influence in recruitment of civilians to high administrative posts such as the cabinet.³⁴ Military officers assume managerial and executive duties in a wide variety of government ministries, agencies, and corporations, either for security reasons (civil aviation, nuclear energy, oil, telecommunications, steel, etc.) or because those agencies require technical competence in which the military excels.³⁵ Civic

action is well-established on a wide front and military contributions range further, into cartography, weather reporting, oceanography, professional training, and research and development. Since 1972, civil and military aviation control has been under a single military authority. A return to civilian rule would still be likely to continue military participation in most of the permanent national objectives.

Future Policy Directions. In the early years of the military regime, the ESG suffered little significant opposition in implementing its version of the national security doctrine, but 13 years of military rule and modernization have brought other ideas and agencies concerned about national security, including the Planning Ministry and the presidential staff. As Brazil grows, especially if it should adopt a more open political system, the doctrine's institutional formulation will expand, and perhaps its acceptance and its application to broad areas of national life will become more effectively controversial than at present (when such is not an allowable topic of public debate). The ESG remains one of the principal places where a broad national plan is being thought out and revised, a think tank to research for, suggest to, and advise the highest executive agencies and therefore policy-relevant as long as the military command defines or approves broad governmental goals.

During the academic year of 1976, the ESG's policy-relevant tasks were somewhat enhanced, and there are indications that it will be expected to be more productive of practical solutions and options via staff and student studies. Particularly significant are the areas of national security planning, intelligence (in cooperation with the National Intelligence School), refinement of a national military doctrine for combined use of the three services, and specific assigned political-economic problems related to national capability evaluation, national necessities and obstacles analysis, and national interest attainment strategies. Another ESG mission is to prepare a National Mobilization Course, starting in 1977, to train civilian and military personnel to plan and manage a national mobilization effort, should the president declare an appropriate national emergency for which the normal administrative procedures are judged inadequate. The elaboration of this new national mobilization doctrine and the preparation of officials to implement it will represent a major capability addition to Brazil's public administration and a new facet of the national security doctrine. In time, as with the earlier national intelligence course, it is expected that the mobilization course will have a school of its own.³⁶

Much has improved since the decline of terrorism in 1972, but negative effects of the doctrine's application still include an authoritarian rigidification of the political system in terms of absolutes and consideration as "provocation" any reassertion of countervailing congressional, judicial, or public opinion/electoral power. Many Brazilians were apparently willing to accept restrictions on freedom as long as there was a clear security threat and strong economic growth for betterment in the long run, but the troubled economy and increased political restrictions since early 1975 have called this system of trade-offs into serious question. Much of the middle class, observing political arrest and detention patterns of the past two years, appears to believe the "communist menace" to be a bogeyman of governmental convenience. At the same time, under heavy pressure from hardliners since opposition party gains in the November, 1974, congressional elections, and faced with MDB resistance in Congress, Geisel has given up earlier pledges hinting at liberalization and has increasingly relied on *ad hoc* political restriction expedients, amid expansion of the state's role in the national economy and reaffirmations by the Minister of Justice of the need to be vigilant against subversives. It remains to be seen what might happen to the elitist conception of "Security and Development" if both the economy and the political gimmickry falter simultaneously.

Impact of the Doctrine on Military Expenditures. For the service branches, mission expansion has required a higher level of performance over an expanded territory, for which quantity and quality of equipment proved inadequate. Although the War Materials Industry (IMBEL) was recently created and procurement of sophisticated equipment made from abroad, national military expenditures for the approximately 210,000 men under arms have been relatively low and heavily directed toward personnel costs (83.5 percent of the 1950-69 budgets, for example) and civic action.³⁷ From 1971 to 1975, Brazil's military expenditures averaged 2.1 percent of its GNP, with average annual expenditure per capita at \$20.80 in 1975. The 1974 military budget was 11.1 percent of the central government's expenses for that year. Brazil's 2.1 percent of the GNP in military expenditures, 1971-75, can be compared with all developing countries (5.9 percent), Latin America (1.8 percent), and individual developed countries with pacifistic reputations, such as Sweden (3.4 percent), Norway (3.3 percent), and Switzerland (2.0 percent). Its 1975 military expenditures were \$2.44 billion.³⁸

As Table 1 shows, Brazil's security doctrine has not led to a large military effort, when measured in relation to size of population and the economy, because the country ranks comparatively low in the world on those indicators. A big military establishment is not part of Brazil's image of its major power status ambitions at present. It has, however, notably increased its arms exports from nearly nothing to \$23 million in 1975 and is undertaking sales of planes and armored vehicles in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

The International Side of National Security. The focus of Brazil's national security policy is still heavily domestic, but as the country grows a larger international component will be added. Although Brazil's military forces are the largest and best equipped in Latin America, their mission is internal and they have limited resources for external conflict. With no serious foreign threat and surrounded by weaker states, Brazil has been careful to avoid any bellicose stances in order to have good political relations with its neighbors, some already concerned about its expanding economic influence. In particular, contrary to persistent rumors in the United States, care has been taken to avoid any appearance of inviting an arms race with Argentina.

If security matters are understood in the broadest sense, Brazil has a number of interests already emerging. Its large investment in the Itaipu dam in partnership with Paraguay gives it an interest in that country's stability. Brazil is also concerned with having politically compatible regimes along its borders, an issue which peaked once in 1971-72 with Torres in Bolivia and Allende in Chile but could arise again should strong left-wing movements reappear. As settlement of the interior and a military presence push out into the border regions distant from coastal population centers, rivalry with neighboring states could occur, as already has happened in a mild way with Venezuela and Guyana. Growing numbers of Brazilians are also crossing borders to settle in neighboring countries, especially Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia, and Brasília can be expected to be attentive to their condition. Finally, there is the nascent (but still somewhat academic) attention paid to the Soviet presence in the South Atlantic and the Cubans in Angola, as well as to potential Cuban influence in more radical Caribbean states (including Guyana, which borders on Brazil's Amazon region).

The traditional casting of the military's strategic thinking in geopolitical terms will facilitate development of an international side to the doctrine. Presently, despite some fundamental ideological objection, the military consensus has gone along with the Foreign

Table 1

Brazil's Global Rank on Measures of Military Expenditures and Effort

Year	Popu- lation	GNP	Armed Forces Size	Military Expen- ditures	Arms Exports	Arms Imports	Military Expen- ditures per Soldier	GNP per Capita	Military Expen- ditures per Capita	Armed Forces Per 1000 Popu- lation	Military Expen- ditures as a % of GNP
1966	8	14	16	22	72	54	53	62	61	70	68
1970	8	12	16	19	76	47	49	62	66	73	71
1975	7	10	13	19	22	32	54	54	63	76	84

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966-1975*, Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1976.

Ministry's economic pragmatism of dealing with Cuba in Latin American international organizations and in sugar negotiations, trading heavily with China and Eastern Europe, improving relations with Marxist Guyana, accepting ideological pluralism in South America (at the moment practically a moot question), striving for better relations with Angola, and playing up to the Third World in international organizations. Should strongly anti-Brazilian regimes appear closer to home, this tolerance can be expected to become severely strained.

A Brazilian scholar of Latin American international relations has insightfully observed that a new, independent power zone is developing in South America, conditioned by several factors: the upsurge in the number of military governments, the increasing role of the state in national life, occupation of the center of the continent, US-Soviet detente, alternate arms suppliers to the United States, the loosening of the hemispheric alliance system, and a rapid decline in American interest and political-military influence.³⁹ The middle and larger countries of the continent are therefore now able to think in terms of a more competitive national security diplomacy, with Brazil certain to be the dominant power in the zone. Its rupture of the quarter-century military assistance pact with the United States over human rights disagreements merely highlights its determination to pursue its own interests autonomously, domestically and internationally, and perhaps to collaborate with those conservative southern cone governments that take similar security positions and experienced American military aid curtailments.⁴⁰ Far from allowing us to write Brazil off or to ignore it, the latest crises in Brazilian-American relations, coming after years of comparative cooperation, show the limits of American political influence with allies and demonstrate that now and in the future Brazil's national security views merit upgraded attention as a new South American and hemispheric political-military pattern emerges.

ENDNOTES

1. An optimistic assessment of the regime and possibilities for Brazil's integration into the Western community is given by former US Ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, in his "Brazil's Future World Role," *Orbis*, XVI, No. 3, Fall, 1972, pp. 621-631. Also see: H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: Developmentalism and Beyond," *Orbis*, XVI, No. 1, Spring, 1972, pp. 64-77; Norman A. Bailey and Ronald M. Schneider, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: A Case Study in Upward Mobility," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XXVII, No. 4, Spring, 1974, pp. 3-25; Riordan Roett, "Brazil Ascendant: International Relations and Geopolitics in the Late 20th Century," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXIX, No. 2, 1975, pp. 139-154; and Ronald M. Schneider, *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976. Thoughts on Brazil's strategic significance to the United States in the South Atlantic context are found in Kenneth E. Roberts, *US Defense and the South Atlantic*, Military Issues Research Memorandum, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 8, 1976.

2. Ray Cline, *World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1975, p. 124. Cline's formula is $P_p = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$, or Perceived Power = (Critical Mass + Economic Capability + Military Capability) \times (Strategic Purpose + National Will).

3. Ronald M. Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, p. 244.

4. Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan III, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1971, pp. 102-105.

5. Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 175-176. Analysis of the military's role in Brazilian life can also be found in Henry H. Keith and Robert A. Hayes, eds., *Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil*, Tempe, Arizona: Arizona State University Center for Latin American Studies, 1976.

6. *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, November 1975*, Washington, DC: Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense, 1975, pp. 12-13. The Brazilian figure represents 11.8 percent of the Latin American total and 1.9 percent of the worldwide MAP total.

7. Quoted in Thomas G. Sanders, "Development and Security are Linked by a Relationship of Mutual Causality," *American Universities Fieldstaff Reports*, East Coast South America Series, XV, No. 3, 1971, p. 3.

8. Philip Raine, *Brazil: Awakening Giant*, Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1974, pp. 109-110.

9. General Antonio Jorge Corrêa, "A influência da Escola Superior de Guerra no pensamento político e estratégico das elites brasileiras," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, XXV, No. 163, 1976, p. 64.

10. Sanders, p. 3.

11. "Geisel diz a estagiários da ESG que segurança é problema geral da Nação," *Jornal do Brasil*, August 20, 1975, p. 4.

12. General João Bina Machado, "A Escola Superior de Guerra: Origem-Evolução-Tendências," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, XXII, No. 153, 1973, pp. 15-18.

13. General Augusto Fragoso, "A Doutrina de Desenvolvimento e Segurança: Origem-Evolução-Atualidade," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, XXIV, No. 160, 1975, pp. 89-110.

14. Golbery's *Geopolitics of Brazil (Geopolítica do Brasil)*, Rio: José Olympio, 1967, for example, is largely a compendium of his lectures and writing of the 1950's. Also see his *Strategic Planning (Planejamento Estratégico)*, Rio: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1955.

15. Robert D. Evans, "The Brazilian Revolution of 1964: Political Surgery without Anaesthetics," *International Affairs*, London, XLIV, 1968, p. 280.

16. Stepan, pp. 186-187.

17. Fragoso, p. 100.

18. Professor Tarcisio Meirelles Padilha, "Segurança Nacional," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, XX, No. 147, 1971, p. 36.

19. Although early formulations of the security-development nexus are latent in Brazilian strategic thought of the 1950's, it was the theory of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency which really brought them into greater elaboration. According to this author's observations at the ESG and perusal of its literature, American defense doctrine on developing countries had a considerable impact in Brazil, although not in its most sophisticated form. The speeches and writings of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on the societal prerequisites of security policy made an impression on leaders of the armed services during the 1964-75 period. See ESG Commandant General Walter de Menezes Paes' "A Escola Superior de Guerra," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, XXIV, No. 159, 1975, p. 28, which cites McNamara's *Essence of Security: Reflections in Office*, Harper and Row, 1968.

20. Schneider, pp. 250-252. On the functioning of ECEME, see General J. Bina Machado, "The Making of Brazilian Staff Officers," *Military Review*, L, April, 1970, pp. 75-81.

21. Alexandre de S. C. Barros, "The Changing Role of the State in Brazil: The Technocratic Military Alliance," Paper presented at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, March 25-28, 1976, pp. 16-17.

22. Mário Pessoa, "Legislação Brasileira e Segurança Nacional," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, XXIV, No. 158, 1975, p. 148.

23. Although the ESG's current national objectives list is public, according to a student of the topic the substantive results of the NSC national interest deliberations (on both permanent and current objectives) have not been revealed for security reasons and are implemented by secret executive decrees available only to a restricted number of responsible officials, as regulated by a decree of November, 1971. (Pessoa, *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149). Given the coherence of the regime's policies, however, the pattern of these objectives can be traced in major public statements such as the Second National Development Plan.

24. Fragoso, p. 93.

25. Amaral Gurgel, *Segurança e Democracia*, Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora e Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1975, pp. 158-159. This is the most comprehensive civilian overview of the doctrine, written by an ESG graduate and political scientist.

26. Peter Evans, "The Military, the Multinationals, and the 'Miracle': The Political Economy of the Brazilian Model of Development," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, IX, No. 3, 1974, pp. 35-36.

27. One of the best comprehensive treatments of the paternalistic and corporativistic Brazilian political style set within its society and history is Riordan Roett, *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972. The Brazilian political culture has strong strains of "government is as government does," lower participation expectations than in the United States, and more emphasis on concrete results than on process and general participation.

28. *Jornal do Brasil*, November 29, 1976, p. 4. One of the most detailed treatments of the view of democracy taken by the government is found in a speech by Justice Minister Falcão, reproduced in the *Jornal do Brasil*, August 14, 1976, and the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Latin America*, August 24, 1976, pp. D1-D9.

29. "Brazilian Congress Suspended after Challenge to Military," *The Washington Post*, April 2, 1977, p. A18.

30. Irving Louis Horowitz and Ellen Kay Trimberger, "State Power and Military Nationalism in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, VIII, No. 2, January, 1976, pp. 234-235.

31. *Jornal do Brasil*, November 6, 1975, p. 2.

32. An excellent analysis of the regime's staying power in its first decade is given by Bruce R. Drury, "Civil-Military Relations and Military Rule: Brazil Since 1964," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, II, Fall, 1974, pp. 191-203.

33. Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. by Alfred Stepan, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 47-65.

34. Max G. Manwaring, "Career Patterns and Attitudes in Four Brazilian Military Administrations: Similarity and Continuity, 1964-1975," Paper presented at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 25-28, 1976.

35. Barros, pp. 13-14. In mid-1976, a senator of the government party put at 12,000 the number of military men working in state enterprises of all sorts. (*Negócios em Exame*, June 16, 1976, p. 5.)

36. Very interesting for its delineation of future responsibilities of the ESG is the speech of EMFA Chief of Staff General Correa opening the 1976 academic year: "A influência da ESG no pensamento político e estratégico das elites brasileiras," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, No. 163, 1976, pp. 61-69 (particularly pp. 66-69).

37. General Antonio Carlos da Silva Muricy, "O Exército como Instrumento da Ação Política Nacional," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, XX, No. 143, 1971, p. 75.

38. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966-1975*, Washington, DC: USACDA, 1976. Brazil's standing in the Latin American arms importation context from 1963-73 can be seen in Col. Norman M. Smith, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America," in *Latin America's New Internationalism: The End of Hemispheric Isolation*, ed. by Roger W. Fontaine and James D. Theberge, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976, pp. 242-266.

39. Alexandre de S.C. Barros, "The Diplomacy of National Security: South American International Relations in a Defrosting World," in *Latin America: The Search for a New International Role*, ed. by Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jón Rosenbaum, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975, p. 149.

40. The US military relationship with Brazil had already begun to loosen, largely by mutual agreement, and probably would have loosened even more anyway by late 1977 with the reduction of American Military Assistance Advisory Groups worldwide, Brazil's own capabilities increase, and diversification of its foreign relations. As an illustration, according to one quantitative study ranking US military commitments worldwide (defense agreements, policy actions or statements, military and economic support actions, arms transfers, troop deployment, and trade), Brazil in 1968 ranked fourth, behind only South Vietnam, Canada, and West Germany. In 1974 Brazil stood only twenty-third, with just four countries having a lower commitment score that was still above 0.0. Consult Wayne R. Martin, "The Measurement of International Military Commitments for Crisis Early Warning," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXI, No. 1, March, 1977, pp. 151-180.

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